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INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
1
Rights (TRIPs Agreement) was established at the ministerial meeting
in Marrakesh in April 1994. Since its establishment, many less
developed countries have been dissatisfied with the international
intellectual property system. From their perspective, the system fails to
take into consideration their needs, interests, and local conditions. The
strong protection mandated under the TRIPs Agreement also threatens
their much-needed access to information, knowledge, and essential
medicines.
This year marks the tenth anniversary of the TRIPs Agreement. It
provides an excellent opportunity to assess the Agreement’s
achievements and shortfalls, in particular its impact on the international
community as well as on other areas not related to intellectual property,
such as agriculture, health, environment, education, and culture. As we
move into the second decade of this Agreement, it is also appropriate to
explore how we can preserve the goals and intentions behind the TRIPs
negotiations and to look ahead at the future challenges confronting the
international intellectual property system.
This Article traces the development of the TRIPs Agreement and
explores what less developed countries need to do to preserve the goals
and intentions behind the TRIPs negotiations. Part I describes the four
different narratives used to explain the origins of the Agreement. This
Part contends that while none of these narratives is complete, each
provides valuable insight into understanding the context in which the
Agreement was created. Part II focuses on the TRIPs Agreement and
explores why less developed countries have been dissatisfied with the
international intellectual property system. This Part also discusses the
latest developments in the area, such as the recent World Trade
Organization (WTO) debacle in Cancún, the proliferation of bilateral
and plurilateral free trade agreements, and the increasing use of
technological protection measures. Part III offers suggestions on how
less developed countries can reform the international intellectual
property system. This Article does not call for a complete overhaul or
the abandonment of the TRIPs Agreement. Instead, it takes the
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
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position that the Agreement is here to stay and explores, from that
standpoint, how less developed countries can take advantage of the
Agreement and reform the international intellectual property system.
I. THE PAST
A. The Bargain Narrative
Four dominant narratives have accounted for the origins of the
TRIPs Agreement. The most widely accepted narrative is the bargain
2
narrative, in which the Agreement was considered the product of a
compromise between developed and less developed countries. While
developed countries received stronger protection for intellectual
property rights and a reduction in restrictions against foreign direct
investment, less developed countries obtained, in return, lower tariffs on
textiles and agriculture and protection via the mandatory dispute
settlement process against unilateral sanctions imposed by the United
States and other developed countries.
At the time of the negotiations, the bargaining power between
developed and less developed countries was far from equal. A case in
point is the difference between the protection developed countries
obtained through the TRIPs Agreement and the protection less
developed countries obtained through the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing. While developed countries have to “phase out” their quotas
on the most sensitive items of textiles and clothing on the last day of the
ten-year transitional period, less developed countries are required to
“phase in” product patents for pharmaceuticals on the first day of the
3
identical transitional period.
In addition, although the TRIPs
Agreement required less developed countries to strengthen intellectual
property protection, it guaranteed the prospects of neither technical
assistance from developed countries nor increased foreign investment.
As one commentator noted, “[T]o pass and enforce the laws that create
the US$60 billion a year obligation is a bound obligation; however, the
implementation assistance and the impact on investment and innovation

2. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12 (1998); Frederick M. Abbott, The
WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION 39 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds.,
1997).
3. See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (2001).
AND THE

YU - FORMATTED

3/3/2006 12:30:56 PM

372 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:2
4

are not.”
Notwithstanding the unequal bargaining power, each group of
countries seemed to have been able to obtain what they considered to
be in their self-interests. Before the turn of this century, there was no
doubt that agriculture and textile products were more important to less
developed countries than intellectual property-related goods and
services. Even today, these trade items remain very important—so
important that the disagreement over how to handle these items, or
more precisely how to handle subsidies in the area, led to the
5
breakdown of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún. Indeed, the
recent Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong would have been another
failure had the WTO member states been unable to agree on a deadline
6
for ending subsidies for agricultural exports.
Moreover, less developed countries had been very concerned about
unilateral trade sanctions since Congress introduced the Omnibus Trade
7
and Competitiveness Act in 1988. Aimed at bolstering the leverage of
U.S. trade negotiations, that statute amended section 301 of the 1974
Trade Act and requires the United States Trade Representative to
identify foreign countries that provide inadequate intellectual property
protection or that deny American intellectual property goods fair or
8
equitable market access.
By offering a mandatory dispute settlement process, the TRIPs
Agreement shields less developed countries from threats of trade
sanctions. Indeed, many less developed countries claimed that it would
have been pointless for them to join the WTO had the United States
been able to continue imposing unilateral sanctions despite their
9
membership. Fortunately, in United States—Sections 301–310 of the
Trade Act of 1974, the WTO dispute settlement panel confirmed that a

4. J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE:
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (J. Michael Finger
& Philip Schuler eds., 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/Poor_Peoples_
Knowledge.pdf.
5. See Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2003, at A1; Editorial, The Cancun Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A24.
6. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Officials Agree to End Subsidies for Agricultural Exports,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at C1.
7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2495 (2000).
8. Id. § 2242(a)(1).
9. See, e.g., David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The
Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 893, 909 (1989) (suggesting that states might
not accept new multilateral commitments in the intellectual property area if they are going to
be vulnerable to unilateral actions).
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member state could only pursue unilateral sanctions after it had
exhausted all actions permissible under the rules of the international
10
trading body.
Although the bargain narrative is fairly convincing and widely
accepted, commentators, most notably Susan Sell, have recently
provided a counter-narrative challenging the role of the governments of
the United States and the European Communities as stated in the
11
narrative. As Professor Sell explained:
State-centric accounts of the Uruguay Round are at best
incomplete, and at worst misleading, as they obscure the driving
forces behind the TRIPS Agreement. . . . In the TRIPS case,
private actors pursued their interests through multiple channels
and struck bargains with multiple actors: domestic interindustry
counterparts, domestic governments, foreign governments,
foreign private sector counterparts, domestic and foreign
industry associations, and international organizations. They
vigorously pursued their IP objectives at all possible levels and in
multiple venues, successfully redefining intellectual property as a
trade issue. . . . [I]t was not merely their relative economic power
that led to their ultimate success, but their command of IP
expertise, their ideas, their information, and their framing skills
12
(translating complex issues into political discourse).
B. The Coercion Narrative
The second narrative is the coercion narrative. This narrative is
common among scholars who originate from, or who are sympathetic to,
less developed countries. In this narrative, the TRIPs Agreement is
considered an unfair trade document that developed countries imposed
on their less developed counterparts. The Agreement is “coercive,”
“imperialistic,” and does not take into consideration the goals and
13
interests of less developed countries.
As Jagdish Bhagwati noted:
10. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
11. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role
of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 830 (2003)
[hereinafter Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO] (observing that “successful
rent-seeking transforms the state into an agent of a particular segment of society instead of a
guardian of welfare for all”).
12. SELL, supra note 11, at 8; see also Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO,
supra note 11, at 846 (noting that “the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement was a
combination of sub-sets of coalitions of private industry and their respective states”).
13. See sources cited in Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving
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“TRIPS does not involve mutual gain; rather, it positions the WTO
primarily as a collector of intellectual property-related rents on behalf
14
of multinational corporations.”
Consider, for example, geographical indications. Article 23 of the
TRIPs Agreement offers special protection to geographical indications
15
for wines and spirits. However, it does not offer similar protection to
Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea, which are important to less developed
16
Even worse for these countries, the protection granted
countries.
under the Agreement focuses on individual creations—often with an
identified author or inventor. It, therefore, does not protect those
outside the existing model, such as “custodians of tribal culture and
medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional artistic and musical
17
forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties.”
While the coercion narrative is thought-provoking, especially from
the perspective of international development, it is far from complete.
Although it is hard to deny that the stronger protection required by the
TRIPs Agreement favors developed countries, it is also difficult to
argue that the TRIPs Agreement is completely unfair to less developed
countries. Indeed, the bargain narrative has suggested otherwise. As
the TRIPs Agreement was created as a compromise between developed
and less developed countries, developed countries received concessions
in the intellectual property area while less developed countries received
benefits elsewhere. Thus, it is logical for the TRIPs Agreement to be
one-sided in the intellectual property area.
Viewed from this
Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 580 (2002)
[hereinafter Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach].
14. Jagdish Bhagwati, What It Will Take to Get Developing Countries into a New
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in DEP’T FOREIGN AFFS. & INT’L TRADE, TRADE
POLICY RESEARCH 2001, at 19, 21 (2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eet/pdf/
02-en.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2005).
15. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 23.
16. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 239 (2000) (noting that “the evolving language in TRIPS on geographical
indications remains largely . . . confined to wines and spirits, while many developing countries
point to food products that could be protected to their advantage, such as Basmati rice and
Darjeeling tea”). Obviously, it is much easier to settle on the protection of geographical
indications used in wines and spirits than to develop comparable protection for Basmati rice
and Darjeeling tea. While the former has been widely accepted in Europe, questions remain
as to whether the latter fits well in the geographical indications category. Nevertheless, this
example shows that the TRIPs Agreement covers issues more important to developed
countries than to their less developed counterparts.
17. The Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 192, 193 (1996).
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perspective, the TRIPs Agreement is not biased because developed
countries are unfair to less developed countries. Rather, it is biased
because those who find it biased focus solely on the Agreement while
ignoring the context of the WTO bargaining process and the crosssectoral concessions less developed countries have gained in other areas.
Moreover, as Ruth Okediji noted:
Rationalizations that depict the TRIPS Agreement as another
example of North-South power disparities tell a much too simple
story. Indeed, one of the noted triumphs of the Uruguay Round
was the unprecedented level of developing country participation
in the negotiations. Within the specific context of the TRIPS
negotiations, alliances that formed over a variety of subjects
crossed the traditional North-South divisions. These alliances
also included industry groups whose positions on issues
(ultimately of tremendous influence on official government
positions) also had to be reconciled with competing intra18
industry priorities.
C. The Ignorance Narrative
The third narrative is the ignorance narrative. In this narrative, less
developed countries are portrayed as countries that did not understand
the importance of intellectual property protection during the TRIPs
negotiations. Because of their ignorance, many less developed countries
did not understand the consequence of the Agreement and how the
required protection would impact their countries in such other areas as
agriculture, health, environment, education, and culture.
While the TRIPs Agreement no doubt has awoken many less
19
developed countries, as well as nongovernmental organizations, it is
factually incorrect to assume that less developed countries did not
understand any importance of intellectual property protection. Since
the mid-1960s, less developed countries have been making demands for
reforming the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne Convention) and the Paris Convention for the
20
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention).
During the
revision of the Berne Convention at the Stockholm Revision

18. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO, supra note 11, at 839–40
(footnote omitted).
19. See SELL, supra note 11, at 181.
20. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual
Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents].

YU - FORMATTED

3/3/2006 12:30:56 PM

376 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:2

Conference, for example, less developed countries, led by India,
demanded “that unless some major copyright concessions were made
for developing countries, they would have to make drastic changes in
21
their international copyright arrangements.” In addition, it was the
breakdown of the 1981 Diplomatic Conference in Nairobi over the
revision of the Paris Convention that forced developed countries to shift
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO forum.
D. The Self-interest Narrative
The final narrative is the self-interest narrative. In an article that
sought to respond to the bargain narrative, Edmund Kitch offered an
alternative story that suggested that less developed countries agreed to
stronger intellectual property protection because they found such
22
protection in their self-interests. Focusing on the patent system, he
found three reasons why less developed countries were interested in
implementing stronger protection called for by the TRIPs Agreement.
First, “[t]echnology does not simply consist of a collection of
instructions as to how to proceed, and patents do not, standing alone,
23
contain the necessary information.”
As Professor Kitch put it
memorably, “technology is not a collection of recipes[,] and patents are
24
not a cookbook.” Second, the technology needed by those countries is
25
unique and, therefore, different from what developed countries need.
Third, “the ability of patent owners to charge for the use of their patent
rights, either in the form of royalties or through end product prices[,] is
constrained by the ability of the country granting the patent rights to
26
pay.”
The economic impact of stronger patent protection on less
developed countries is therefore limited, because they, as poor
27
countries, pay less than the more wealthy counterparts for patent use.

21. Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright—Past,
Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1065 (1968).
22. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 166 (1994).
23. Id. at 171; see also id. at 171–76 (discussing how patents alone might not contain all
the necessary information to promote technological advances).
24. Id. at 171.
25. See id. at 176–77.
26. Id. at 171.
27. This argument ignores the fact that patent rights holders might decide to withhold
their technology from less developed countries because the royalties or product prices
available in those countries are too low to be attractive. It therefore understates the
economic impact created by the lack of access to unaffordable technologies needed by less
developed countries.
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These benefits are important to less developed countries, as
28
knowledge production is cumulative, and it takes time for the
intellectual property system to develop. As Rochelle Dreyfuss noted
insightfully, there is a major difference between the decision by
policymakers to forgo the manufacture of automobiles and the decision
to forgo the development of an intellectual property system:
The decision to forgo the manufacture of, say, automobiles is not
permanent. Should a nation decide it no longer wishes to rely on
foreign supply, or should the market for motor vehicles grow
more lucrative, there is nothing in the GATT to prevent the
citizens of that nation from entering the automobile sector. The
same is not true of intellectual property.
Innovation is
knowledge-intensive. Educating a citizenry to the level where it
is technically and culturally sophisticated enough to innovate at
globally competitive levels may become prohibitively expensive
once intellectual property rights are recognized. Thus, unless
some concession is made to user interests, any nation that is now
29
behind will likely stay there.
Notwithstanding the benefits of intellectual property protection,
countries sometimes might not be able to implement policy changes that
are in their best interests, at least in the best interests of the country as a
whole. As Professor Kitch explained in the patent context:
If patent protection is weak or non-existent, industries will
develop that rely for their existence on their ability to ignore the
international patent system.
Once these industries have
developed, they have an interest in resisting any change in the
rules. Although it may be in the overall, long run interest of the
country to participate in both form and substance in the
international patent system, the adversely affected industries will
have incentives to expend their political capital to keep that from
happening. Thus even if full participation is as a theoretical
matter the optimum strategy in the long run, once a country
departs from that strategy it may find that internal political
forces block a return to the optimum. Outsiders can play a
constructive role by insisting that the issues be addressed within
30
a larger and principled framework.
28. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004).
29. Id. at 29 (footnote omitted).
30. Kitch, supra note 22, at 178; see also Robert P. Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms:
Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 239, 243–44 (1990) [hereinafter Merges,
Battle of the Lateralisms] (observing that “representatives of the ‘pirate’ industries may have
enough political clout to block the proposed changes” even though those changes might be in
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In that scenario, multilateral negotiations such as the TRIPs
Agreement become important, as they “plac[e] larger interests of the
nation at risk in the negotiations . . . [and] invite participation from
larger economic players who can offset the political influence of the
31
entrenched pirate groups.” Nevertheless, it is mistaken to assume that
pirate industries are always “overrepresented” in the legislative
processes of those less developed countries that opposed stronger
32
intellectual property protection. Moreover, as I pointed out elsewhere
in the context of U.S.-led intellectual property reform efforts in China,
foreign pushes have serious limitations and sometimes may backfire on
33
those pushing the policy.
In sum, the self-interest narrative provides a convincing explanation
why less developed countries need to embrace stronger intellectual
property protection. As Professor Kitch noted in the beginning of his
article, “[t]he purpose is to identify issues that technologically deprived
countries must face if they desire to encourage the development of
enhanced domestic technological capability, based on the assumption
that their system of intellectual property resembles the American
34
system—as the GATT agreement requires.” Because the article is
35
“conceptual,” the narrative it advanced sits uneasily with the historical
facts advanced by the three other narratives.
For example, the self-interest narrative directly contradicts the
coercion narrative, which posits that the TRIPs Agreement was imposed
upon less developed countries against their self-interests. It also sits
uneasily with the ignorance narrative, which holds that less developed
countries failed to understand the importance of intellectual property
protection during the TRIPs negotiations. Moreover, the self-interest
narrative challenges the bargain narrative by suggesting that negotiators
from developed countries had given their less developed counterparts
concessions in other areas even though it is in their adversaries’ selfinterests to sign on to the TRIPs Agreement.
Given their
the best interests of a country as a whole).
31. Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms, supra note 30, at 244.
32. See id. (maintaining that “[t]here is no reason to assume that pirate industries are
overrepresented in the legislative processes of all countries that oppose broadened rights”).
33. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 437–42 (2003)
(discussing the limitations of a coercive foreign intellectual property policy); see also Peter K.
Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First
Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140–54 (2000) (discussing the cycle of futility in the U.S.
foreign intellectual property policy toward China).
34. Kitch, supra note 22, at 167.
35. Id.
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sophistication, these negotiators are unlikely to be as ineffective as the
ignorance narrative has suggested.
E. Summary
The TRIPs Agreement had very complex origins. It is very difficult
to pinpoint how the Agreement was created. Thus, instead of
attempting the impossible task of suggesting which narrative is correct,
this Article highlights the tension between the different, and sometimes
competing, narratives in the hope that readers will have a better
understanding of the background behind the TRIPs negotiations and be
able to draw their own conclusions.
II. THE PRESENT
Since the TRIPs Agreement went into effect, less developed
countries have been very dissatisfied with the international intellectual
property system. Commentators generally attribute this discontent to
the ten-year-old Agreement. While these commentators were correct in
making this link, less developed countries are more frustrated with the
larger WTO system than with the TRIPs Agreement. This Part focuses
primarily on the bargain narrative, but it also touches on the ignorance
and self-interest narratives. It, however, omits a large portion of the
coercion narrative, because such a narrative, by definition, assumes the
existence of an unfair international trading system and, therefore,
suggests discontent among less developed countries.
Let us start with the bargain narrative. If one is to believe that the
TRIPs Agreement is a compromise, empirical records have indicated
that less developed countries not only got a bad bargain, as some would
say, but also a failed bargain. Although developed countries promised
to reduce tariffs and subsidies in the agricultural and textile areas in
exchange for stronger intellectual property protection and wider market
36
access, they failed to honor these promises.
This failure was
highlighted in the recent WTO debacle in Cancún, in which less
developed countries were disillusioned from the process and became
36. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROP. RIGHTS & DEV. POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP.
RIGHTS 8 (2003) [hereinafter IPR COMM’N REPORT] (noting that many less developed
countries “feel that the commitments made by developed countries to liberalise agriculture
and textiles and reduce tariffs, have not been honoured, while they have to live with the
burdens of the TRIPS agreement”); SELL, supra note 11, at 173 (stating that “there is . . . no
evidence that developed countries are making good on their commitments to open their
markets more widely to developing countries’ agricultural and textile exports”).
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unwilling to negotiate other issues, such as investment, competition
37
policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.
Even if these countries were able to obtain what they bargained for
during the TRIPs negotiations, the Agreement would remain
problematic because they would still come out as a group of “loser”
countries. The twenty-first century is primarily about the knowledge38
based economy, rather than agriculture and manufacturing industries.
Gains by less developed countries in the areas of agriculture and
textiles, therefore, would not make up for losses in the intellectual
property and information technology areas. In fact, by conceding
positions in the latter, less developed countries would be required to
play catch-up using an outdated competition model.
Moreover, intellectual property protection often spills over into
other areas, and “[i]ncreasingly, agricultural goods are the subject of
intellectual property rights as patents are extended to seeds and
39
plants.” As a study by the World Bank has shown, less developed
countries could lose up to $20 billion if the TRIPs Agreement were fully
40
implemented. Even worse, some commentators have pointed out that
“the implementation of international IP rules represents a net shortterm financial loss that, it may be plausibly argued, is unlikely to be
41
offset by economic and social gains for a very long time.” Even if these
countries are able to obtain gains in selected areas, there is no guarantee
that the wealth will be transferred from the beneficiary sectors to the
42
disadvantaged ones. As a result, the disparity of wealth between the

37. See sources cited supra note 5.
38. See, e.g., LESTER C. THUROW, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR
INDIVIDUALS, COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (2000).
39. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 11 (2002).
40. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 2002, at xvii (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2002
/Resources/gep2002complete.pdf (noting that “[i]f TRIPS were fully implemented, rent
transfers to major technology-creating countries—particularly the United States, Germany,
and France—in the form of pharmaceutical patents, computer chip designs, and other
intellectual property, would amount to more than $20 billion”).
41. Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, Foreword to TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY, at x (Christophe Bellmann et al.
eds., 2003) [hereinafter TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE].
42. As Frederick Abbott noted in the context of pharmaceuticals:
The problem with . . . using net economic gains or losses as the developing country
benchmark is that gains for a developing country’s textile or agricultural producers
do not directly translate into higher public or private health expenditures . . . .
Salaries for part of the workforce may increase and government tax revenues may
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rich and the poor in these countries will grow.
Policymakers and industry groups from developed countries have
challenged these claims by suggesting that stronger intellectual property
protection would allow countries to use the system to “leap frog” their
economies. Indeed, in painting the self-interest narrative, Edmund
Kitch provided very strong justifications for adopting stronger
intellectual property protection.
Unfortunately, scholars and
commentators thus far have been unable to demonstrate empirically
how stronger protection would benefit less developed countries and
43
how such protection would maximize global welfare. When Congress
undertook a critical examination of the American patent system, one of
its experts, Fritz Machlup, could not help but conclude that he could not
say for certain whether the patent system was good for his country. As
he remarked famously in a widely-cited quote:
If one does not know whether a system . . . is good or bad, the
safest “policy conclusion” is to “muddle through”—either with it,
if one has long lived with it, or without it, if one has lived without
it. If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible,
on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic
consequences to recommend instituting one. But since we have
had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on
44
the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
In fact, many commentators, especially those who found the
coercion narrative convincing, have suggested that the existing

rise, and this may indirectly help offset pharmaceutical price increases. However, in
order for the health sector not to be adversely affected, there must be some form of
transfer payment, whether in the form of increased public health expenditures on
pharmaceuticals, by providing health insurance benefits, or other affirmative acts.
In a world of economic scarcity, the prospect that governments will act to offset
increases in medicines prices with increased public health expenditures is uncertain.
Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in
Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 33 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006).
43. See Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin
America: Is There Still Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 109, 126
(1997); see also Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual
Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 103–05 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (urging
countries to develop their intellectual property rights regime according to their own needs);
Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
141, 152 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (arguing that an international regime may not yield
overall welfare benefits and that actors outside the regime may suffer).
44. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF
THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup).
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intellectual property system became universal only because it was
45
backed by great economic and military might. The existing system,
therefore, does not embody universal values. Rather, it was successfully
transplanted to less developed countries because they were less
powerful and had been subjected to colonial rule during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
The lack of empirical support is particularly troublesome, because
intellectual property systems require balance, and overprotection is just
as dangerous as underprotection. As Rochelle Dreyfuss pointed out,
“[k]nowledge production is a cumulative enterprise; the storehouse of
information does not grow unless creators have the freedom to learn
46
from, and build on, earlier work.” Thus, if the system overprotects,
intellectual creators will not have enough raw materials to develop their
creations, and the public will not have adequate access to the needed
information and knowledge. In contrast, if the system underprotects,
intellectual creators will not have adequate incentives to create. Many
of them will find the system unfair and unattractive and will prefer to
take up other, more remunerative jobs.
To make matters worse, an inappropriate intellectual property
system would hurt less developed countries more than it would hurt
their developed counterparts. While developed countries may have the
resources and regulatory mechanisms to reduce the impact of an
unbalanced system, the same does not apply to less developed
47
countries.
Many of these countries lack the national economic
45. See, e.g., ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NONINDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 93 (1996) (“[W]hether or not [intellectual property] was
consciously designed to serve economic policies in any of the [industrialized countries], it has
always evolved in response to economic and political necessity.”); William P. Alford, How
Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter: American Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in
East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 17 (1994); see also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE
CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND
THE LAW 247 (1998) (stating that “[t]he range of Western beliefs that define intellectual and
cultural property laws . . . are not universal values that express the full range of human
possibility, but particular, interested fictions emergent from a history of colonialism that has
disempowered many of the world’s peoples”); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 92 (1996) (noting that Western
culture and ideology are sometimes attractive because they are linked to hard economic and
military power).
46. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 22.
47. See IPR COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 4; see MASKUS, supra note 16, at 237
(noting that developed countries “have mature legal systems of corrective interventions” in
which “the exercise of IPRs threatens to be anticompetitive or excessively costly in social
terms”); Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 31 (noting that although “[t]he TRIPS Agreement
recognizes that members may need law to control the abuse of intellectual property rights, . . .
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strengths and established legal mechanisms to overcome problems
created by an unbalanced system. Even if the system is beneficial in the
long run, these countries might lack the needed wealth, infrastructure,
and technological base to take advantage of the opportunities created
48
by the system in the short run.
Thus, it is no surprise that less developed countries have been
concerned about the heightened protection required by the TRIPs
Agreement and its deleterious impact in the areas of agriculture, health,
environment, education, and culture. They are also disappointed and
disturbed by the fact that their developed counterparts, through the
enactment of the TRIPs Agreement, have “kicked away the ladder”
that would have allowed them to catch up and climb to economic
49
success. As one commentator noted:
From the start of the industrial revolution, every country that
became economically great began by copying: the Germans
copied the British; the Americans copied the British and the
Germans, and the Japanese copied everybody. The trust of the
TRIPS Agreement is to ensure that this process of growth by
50
copying and learning by doing will never happen again.
Unfortunately, for less developed countries, this story of discontent
did not end with the TRIPs Agreement. Today, many developed
countries have sought to ratchet up their protection by negotiating
around the TRIPs Agreement, seeking what commentators have called
51
“TRIPs-plus” protection. In recent years, for example, the European
Communities and the United States have used bilateral and plurilateral

countries that did not have enforceable intellectual property laws prior to joining the WTO
had little reason to develop competition law to control right holders” (footnote omitted)).
48. See MASKUS, supra note 16, at 237 (noting that “[l]ong-run gains would come at the
expense of costlier access in the medium term”).
49. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002).
50. William Kingston, An Agenda for Radical Intellectual Property Reform, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 653, 658 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS].
51. Many commentators have become concerned about the “one-way ratchet” of
intellectual property protection. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 22; see LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33
(2003). But see Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 183 (2004) (highlighting public actions taken to invigorate the public domain).
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free trade agreements to strengthen their protection.
To be certain, there are some benefits to using bilateral and
plurilateral treaties. For example, they are more effective in addressing
53
the individual concerns and circumstances of the contracting parties.
They also enable parties to resolve difficult transnational problems in a
54
more expeditious manner. Indeed, by using standardized terms, the
United States successfully used free trade agreements to maximize the
effectiveness and efficiency of its negotiation strategy in the
international trade area. As Peter Drahos observed,
the BIT [bilateral investment treaty] which the United States
signed with Nicaragua in 1995 was based on the prototype that
the United States had developed for such treaties in 1994.
Similarly, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that the United
States has negotiated with Jordan will serve as a model for the
55
other FTAs being negotiated with Chile and Singapore.
However, the bilateral or plurilateral negotiation strategy remains
disturbing to countries that reluctantly joined the TRIPs Agreement to
avoid unilateral trade sanctions, as the bargain narrative has suggested.
Because most of the items negotiated under the bilateral and
52. For excellent discussions of the recent bilateral and plurilateral free trade
agreements, see generally DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
(FTAA) (2003), available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/FTAA(A4).pdf; Carlos M.
Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to
Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79 (2004) [hereinafter Correa, Bilateralism in
Intellectual Property]; Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001) [hereinafter Drahos, BITs and BIPs]; Richard E.
Feinberg, The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade Arrangements, 26 WORLD
ECON. 1019 (2003); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International
Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004) [hereinafter Okediji,
Back to Bilateralism?].
53. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 139 (2001) (noting that the lengthy enforcement action plan annexed to the
1995 China-U.S. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights “imposed more detailed
procedural obligations than could be provided in a multilateral agreement such as TRIPS”);
Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27
GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 327, 339 (1993) (contending that “[b]ilateral agreements
provide the most workable vehicle for addressing the contentious issues surrounding
intellectual property protection”). For discussions of bilateral agreements, see C. Michael
Aho, More Bilateral Agreements Would Be a Blunder: What the New President Should Do, 22
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 25 (1989), Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral
Agreements, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (1989), and Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms, supra
note 30.
54. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 295 (1991).
55. Drahos, BITs and BIPs, supra note 52, at 794.
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plurilateral agreements were considered outside the scope of the TRIPs
Agreement, the Agreement would not shield less developed countries
from trade sanctions. Thus, less developed countries were in no better
position, as far as unilateral sanctions are concerned, than they would
have been had they not signed the TRIPs Agreement.
More problematically, the recent free trade agreements came at a
time when the intellectual property system was under siege domestically
in the developed world. As the ignorance narrative has shown,
56
intellectual property was not of popular interest until recently. Instead
of obscure and technical issues that have no relevance to daily lives, less
developed countries now see intellectual property as very important to
them. In light of this changing perspective and the resulting resistance
to the expansion of intellectual property rights at home, Keith Maskus
and Jerome Reichman were right to note that it was very difficult to find
it “timely to harmonize and elevate international standards of patent
protection—even if that were demonstrably beneficial—when there is so
little agreement in the US itself on how to rectify a dysfunctional
57
apparatus that often seems out of control.”
In addition to free trade agreements, the increasing use of
technological protection measures by intellectual property rights
holders in developed countries has elicited concerns among
policymakers in the less developed world. By using these alternative
protection measures, rights holders in developed countries are now able
to lock up materials that otherwise would be available to less developed
58
countries. The 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties, for example, require
measures that prevent the circumvention of copy-protection
59
technologies used to protect copyrighted works in digital media. The
56. See SELL, supra note 11, at 99 (“To a certain extent IP law is reminiscent of the
Catholic Church when the Bible was in Latin. IP lawyers are privileged purveyors of
expertise as was the Latin-trained clergy.”).
57. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 300 (2004)
(footnote omitted).
58. See IPR COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 106 (“For developing countries, where
Internet connectivity is limited and subscriptions to on-line resources unaffordable, it may
exclude access to these materials altogether and impose a heavy burden that will delay the
participation of those countries in the global knowledge-based society.”); Peter K. Yu, The
Trust and Distrust of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 REVUE QUEBECOISE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2005) (discussing increasing anti-circumvention protection
and the growing erosion of the fair use/fair dealing privilege).
59. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997). For
comprehensive discussions of the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties, see generally MIHÀLY
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deployment of genetic use restriction technologies, which are generally
known as GURTs or “terminator” technologies, also could render seeds
sterile, thus making it physically impossible for them to grow a second
60
crop.
In sum, the TRIPs Agreement has provided many reasons why less
developed countries are dissatisfied with the current international
intellectual property system. However, the Agreement alone does not
result in the current state of dissatisfaction. New developments, such as
the increasing use of TRIPs-plus free trade agreements as well as the
growing use of technological protection measures, have made the
system unbearable.
III. THE FUTURE
In light of the growing discontent among less developed countries
and the inequitable nature of the existing international intellectual
property system, many commentators have called for a radical
reassessment of the existing system. For example, Samuel Oddi has
61
suggested ways to alleviate the adverse impact of the Paris Convention.
Alan Story contended that “it is in the interests of countries of the
South that [the Berne Convention] be repealed and a new framework
62
be established on radically different grounds.” This Article, however,
does not call for either a complete overhaul or the abandonment of the
TRIPs Agreement. Rather, it takes the position that the Agreement is
here to stay and explores, from that standpoint, how less developed
countries can take advantage of the Agreement and reform the
international intellectual property system. This Part proposes eight
courses of action.

FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (2002), and JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON
LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: THE WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY AND THE WIPO
PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY (2002).
60. See IPR COMM’N REPORT, supra note 36, at 60. For a discussion of the impact of
GURTs on less developed countries, see generally Timothy Swanson & Timo Goeschl,
Diffusion and Distribution: The Impacts on Poor Countries of Technological Enforcement
Within the Biotechnology Sector, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 50, at 669.
61. See A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World
Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 855–65.
62. Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention
Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 763, 769 (2003).
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A. Interpret the TRIPs Agreement Through a Pro-Development Lens
As the bargain narrative has taught us, the TRIPs Agreement was
partly the result of a compromise between developed and less
developed countries. While the WTO member states settled on a wide
array of issues, which range from minimum standards of intellectual
property protection to the inclusion of the mandatory dispute
settlement process, they compromised on many others and refused to
63
agree on a select few. Thus, the existing Agreement contains many
64
“constructive ambiguities” that provide countries with “wiggle room,”
65
or “policy space,” to implement the Agreement. By interpreting the
Agreement to take advantage of these ambiguities, less developed
countries may be able to push for language that meets their needs while
preserving the national autonomy appropriately reserved to them
during the negotiation process. They might also be able to use these
provisions as a bulwark against the continuous expansion of intellectual
property rights, which, in turn, may allow less developed countries to
“‘claw[]’ back much of what was lost in the negotiating battles in
66
TRIPS.”
Consider, for example, the word “review” in article 27(3)(b) of the
TRIPs Agreement, which concerns the patentability of diagnostic,

63. The exhaustion issue is a prime example of the failure by the developed and less
developed countries to come to an agreement. Article 6 of the TRIPs Agreement stipulated
that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights.” TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6; see also Vincent
Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPs, International IPR
Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333 (2000) (discussing the
disagreement over the exhaustion issue during the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement).
Even though the WTO member states “agree to disagree” on the exhaustion issue, recent
developments seem to suggest that the European Communities and the United States have
been using bilateral and regional free trade agreements to negotiate around the TRIPs
Agreement. For example, the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement “deals with
the exhaustion issue by requiring each Party to give the patent owner a remedy against a third
party who disturbs a contractual arrangement between a patent owner and licensee.” Peter
Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners and Their
Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53, 60 (2004) (citing
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.7.2, May 6, 2003, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/singapore.htm).
64. WATAL, supra note 3, at 7.
65. See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 28 (1997) [hereinafter Reichman,
From Free Riders to Fair Followers] (contending that “the TRIPS Agreement leaves
developing countries ample ‘wiggle room’ in which to implement national policies favoring
the public interest in free competition”).
66. WATAL, supra note 3, at 7.
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therapeutic, and surgical methods and plants and animals other than
micro-organisms. As Carlos Correa pointed out, “there ha[d] been no
67
agreement in the Council for TRIPS on the meaning of ‘review.’”
While developed countries would have interpreted the word to mean
“review of implementation,” less developed countries were likely to
interpret the word to suggest the possibility for “revising” the
68
Agreement to meet their needs and interests.
How the treaty is interpreted ultimately will affect the rights and
obligations of less developed countries. Thus, it is very important to
interpret the TRIPs Agreement through a pro-development lens. It is
also essential to develop a model law that is “development friendly,” or
a set of model intellectual property systems that take account of local
needs. These model laws and systems will serve as a good starting point
for international negotiations, especially in light of the recent
proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements. They
are also important because many less developed countries still lack
experience with intellectual property protection and the needed human
capital to develop laws that are tailored to their interests and local
69
conditions. As a result, they might have no option but to “meet their
70
TRIPS obligations by simply transcribing its mandates into law.”
This is problematic because the TRIPs Agreement focuses primarily
on laying out the minimum standards of intellectual property protection,
as compared to describing the different possible intellectual property
systems. Consider, for example, the well-illustrated example of trade
secret protection. “[S]ince TRIPS does not mention a right to reverse
engineer [which exists in the United States], transcription would create
a level of protection surpassing that found in the United States, where
71
the right to copy is privileged.” The unexamined transcription of the
TRIPs Agreement into law, therefore, might result in an unbalanced
intellectual property system.
Most recently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) and the International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development (ICTSD) teamed up to implement the
67. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 211 (2000).
68. See id.
69. See Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 25 (noting that many less developed countries
“experience with intellectual property protection [and] sufficient human capital (in the form
of legal talent) to codify wiggles into law”).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Capacity Building Project on Intellectual Property Rights and
Sustainable Development. Among the achievements of this project is
72
the publication of the Resource Book on TRIPS and Development.
Conceived as a practical guide to the TRIPs Agreement, the book seeks
to improve understanding of the development implications of the
Agreement. It offers detailed analysis of each provision of the
Agreement and highlights areas in which the Agreement leaves WTO
member states “wiggle room” to pursue their own policy objectives
based on their levels of development. While one might disagree on the
authors’ interpretation of the Agreement, it is hard to ignore the
importance and promise of this project.
Like interpretation, how one frames the intellectual property debate
is equally important, because such framing might affect the
receptiveness of the WTO member states to the demands, or perhaps
pleas, of the less developed world. As Susan Sell noted insightfully,
“grants talk” is preferable to “rights talk” from the standpoint of
international development, because it “highlights the fact that what may
be granted may be taken away when such grants conflict with other
73
important goals,” such as freedom of expression, public health, and
protection of human rights. Rights talk, by contrast, is likely to
encourage policymakers to focus on the entitlement of the rights holders
while ignoring the public interest safeguards of and the potential
conflicts created by those rights.
B. Explore the Public Interest Safeguards in the TRIPs Agreement
While the TRIPs Agreement created many obligations in less
developed countries, some of which are also new to developed
74
countries, it also includes many important public interest safeguards.
Commentators have noted the importance of articles 7 and 8 of the
Agreement, which provide a basis for seeking waivers “to meet

72. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2004).
73. SELL, supra note 11, at 146.
74. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 365 (noting that changes
required by the TRIPs Agreement “were dramatic for less developed countries, as they went
beyond just intellectual property and affected such other areas as agriculture, health,
environment, education, and culture”); see also WATAL, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that “at
least one, undisclosed information, has never been the subject of any multilateral agreement
before, and another, protection for integrated circuit designs, had no effective international
treaty, while others, like plant variety protection or performers’ rights, were geographically
limited”).
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unforeseen conditions of hardship.” As Jerome Reichman explained:
[C]ountries could attempt to trigger the safeguards implicit in
Articles 7 and 8 in one of two ways. The least destructive
approach would be to convince the Council for TRIPS itself to
recommend narrowly described waivers to meet specified
circumstances for a limited period of time. This approach would
strengthen the mediatory powers of the Council for TRIPS and
help to offset the problems arising from the inability of that body
to quash or stay requests for consultations and disputesettlement panels launched by trigger-happy governments.
Alternatively, developing country defendants responding to
complaints of nullification and impairment under Article 64
might invoke the application of Articles 7 and 8(1) to meet
unforeseen conditions of hardship. This defense, if properly
grounded and supported by factual evidence, could persuade the
Appellate Body either to admit the existence of a tacit doctrine
of frustration built into the aforementioned articles or to buttress
those articles by reaching out to the general doctrine of
frustration recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Either way, overly aggressive complainants could wind
76
up with what would amount to a judicially imposed waiver.
In addition, there are many other important provisions in the TRIPs
Agreement that less developed countries could use to their advantage.
For example, article 4 of the Agreement provides that “any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
77
the nationals of all other Members.”
It therefore may constrain
reciprocal clauses that are increasingly used by developed countries in
78
their free trade agreements. Article 27(2) allows WTO member states
to exclude certain inventions from patentability provided that the
prevention of the commercial exploitation of those inventions “is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect
human, animal or plant life or health, or to avoid serious prejudice to
79
the environment.”
Article 30 enables member states to “provide

75. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with
the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 461 (2000) (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 461–62 (footnote omitted).
77. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.
78. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 380 (discussing the tension
between reciprocity provisions and article 4 of the TRIPs Agreement).
79. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(2).
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limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,” on the
condition that such exceptions satisfy the three-step test—i.e., they “do
not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
81
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”
Article 31 lays down the conditions in which member states can use
patented products without the right holder’s authorization “in the case
82
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”
Article 73 stipulates exceptions for member states to pursue their
essential security interests and to fulfill obligations under the United
Nations Charter in relation to the maintenance of international peace
83
and security.
Until recently, although the WTO dispute settlement panels at times
had “referred to these [limitations and public interest safeguards]
favorably,” the legal literature and WTO panel decisions have
84
underexplored them. Thus, it is very important to highlight them and
develop strategies that help inject them into WTO panel decisions. As
Gregory Shaffer explained, it is important to develop WTO
jurisprudence through the dispute settlement process:
Participation in WTO judicial processes is arguably more
important than is participation in analogous judicial processes for
shaping law in national systems. The difficulty of amending or
interpreting WTO law through the WTO political process
enhances the impact of WTO jurisprudence. WTO law requires
consensus to modify, resulting in a rigid legislative system, with
rule modifications occurring through infrequent negotiating
rounds. Because of the complex bargaining process, rules often

80. Id. art. 30.
81. Id. This three-step test, however, “is not a public interest limitation to exclusive
rights. Instead, it is a limitation on the scope of limitations that member states can implement
to promote access and dissemination of works domestically.” Ruth L. Okediji, Fostering
Access to Education, Research and Dissemination of Knowledge Through Copyright 3–4,
available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Okideiji_Bellagio4.pdf (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Okediji, Fostering Access to Education]. Thus, the threestep test circumscribes the scope of a state’s discretion to create limitations and exceptions to
rights in its national intellectual property laws. Cf. Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core
International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
1 (2005) (proposing to create a new international copyright norm that is in harmony with the
U.S. fair use doctrine based on the Berne Convention’s three-step test).
82. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31.
83. Id. art. 73.
84. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 23 (citing Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products, § 7.26, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000)).
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are drafted in a vague manner, thereby delegating de facto power
to the WTO dispute settlement system to effectively make WTO
law through interpretation.
As a result of the increased importance of WTO
jurisprudence and the rigidity of the WTO political process,
those governments that are able to participate most actively in
the WTO dispute settlement system are best-positioned to
effectively shape the law’s interpretation and application over
85
time.
C. Take Advantage of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process
One of the major strengths of the TRIPs Agreement is the
86
mandatory dispute settlement process.
As Rochelle Dreyfuss and
Andreas Lowenfeld entitled their article, the two achievements of the
87
Uruguay Round are Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together.
In the first few years since its establishment, the dispute settlement
88
process had been used primarily by developed countries.
It is no
surprise that the first intellectual property dispute to reach the Dispute
Settlement Body concerned the United States’ challenge to the
89
noncompliance of India’s patent system with the TRIPs Agreement.
However, as the Agreement matures, less developed countries have
90
begun to use the process more frequently. As William Davey pointed
85. Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who
Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 459, 470 (2004). But see Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 27 (contending that
negotiation within the WTO membership might be more effective than using the dispute
settlement process in effectuating the recognition of positive rights in the TRIPs Agreement).
86. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 63–64 (requiring all disputes arising
under the TRIPs Agreement to be settled by the WTO dispute settlement process).
87. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275
(1997); see also William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years,
8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 32 (2005) [hereinafter Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System]
(noting that “[d]ispute settlement is one of the great successes of the WTO”); Ruth Okediji,
Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 149–50 (2000)
[hereinafter Okediji, International Fair Use Doctrine] (noting that “[o]ne of the most
celebrated accomplishments of the WTO system is the dispute resolution mechanism which
adds legitimacy to the overall design of the new trading system” (footnote omitted)).
88. See Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 87, at 17 (noting that “[t]he
first half of [the first ten years’ operation of the WTO dispute settlement process]—from 1995
through 1999—was characterized by extensive use of the system by the United States initially,
and later by the EU”).
89. Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997).
90. See Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 87, at 24 (noting that “the
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out:
In the first five years of the system’s existence, developing
countries initiated by themselves roughly one-quarter of the
consultation requests. In the four and one-half years from 2000
to June 2004, developing countries initiated 62% of the
consultation requests—more than doubling their relative share of
initiations. . . . Thus, in the last few years developing countries
have become more frequent users of WTO dispute settlement,
both in absolute and relative terms. Interestingly, the majority of
those cases have involved developing country respondents. That
is to say, developing countries seem to have found the WTO
dispute settlement system to be a useful mechanism to deal with
a wide range of trade disputes—using it not only against
developed countries, but also in their trading relations with other
91
developing countries.
A case in point is Brazil, which has made extensive use of the system
in its dealings with other less developed countries, in particular those in
92
South America.
Cases brought by the country “involved trade
remedies imposed by Argentina (textile safeguards; poultry
antidumping duties); Mexico (antidumping duties on transformers);
Peru (countervailing duties on buses); and Turkey (antidumping duties
93
on pipe fittings).” Most recently, the tiny Caribbean islands of Antigua
and Barbuda successfully defeated the United States in their challenge
94
of U.S. laws against Internet and telephone gambling. Ironically, the
United States Trade Representative declared “victory” after the WTO
Appellate Body narrowed the earlier panel decision by upholding only
95
some of the U.S. laws.
To be certain, there are still many problems with the dispute

US and the EC no longer were as dominant as complainants in the system,” and that
“developing country use of the system increased dramatically” in the second half of the first
decade of operation of the WTO dispute settlement process).
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 41.
94. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
95. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Internet Gambling
Restrictions Can Stand as U.S. Wins Key Issues in WTO Dispute, Apr. 7, 2005, available at
http://www.ustr.gov (declaring that “[t]he United States won an important victory today when
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body sided with the United States on key
issues in a challenge to U.S. laws on internet gambling”); see also Appellate Body Report,
United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
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settlement process, such as the lack of transparency of the institution,
limited access by non-Members to the dispute settlement process, the
technical and financial difficulties confronting less developed countries
in their implementation of the treaty obligations, the insensitivity and
undemocratic nature of the decision-making process, and the lack of
96
accountability of policymakers to the global citizenry. The United
States’ recent attempt to substitute compensation for compliance in its
dispute with the European Communities over the Fairness in Music
Licensing Act of 1998 also raises concerns that the WTO system might
97
not equally protect developed and less developed countries. Indeed, as
one commentator noted, the United States’ approach might encourage
other WTO member states “to replace effective enforcement of
intellectual property rights with a cynical ‘exemptions plus
98
compensation’ approach to TRIPS.”
Such an approach, therefore,
might undercut the minimum standards of intellectual property
protection under the TRIPs Agreement while creating instability in the
international trading system.
Notwithstanding these shortfalls, the WTO dispute settlement
process offers promise to less developed countries. As Professor
Shaffer pointed out, the strategies used by less developed countries in
the WTO process will “have implications for their leverage in
international political negotiations and for the policy space in which
they implement domestic intellectual property and public health
99
regimes.” The use of the dispute settlement process may even help
lower the negotiation costs. As he explained:
96. For sources discussing the structural defects of the World Trade Organization, see
Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra note 13, at 585–86.
97. See Award of the Arbitrators, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright
Act: Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU, ¶ 5.1, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov.
9, 2001) (determining the award at €1,219,900 per year). For excellent discussions of the
dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of
International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001), and
Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of
the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
98. Richard Owens, TRIPS and the Fairness in Music Arbitration: The Repercussions,
25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 49, 53 (2003). Compare John H. Jackson, International Law
Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109 (2004) (articulating a view that the result of a WTO dispute settlement
panel report “is to create an international law obligation to comply with that report”), with
Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002) (examining the
WTO dispute settlement process using the economic theory of contract remedies and the
concept of “efficient breach”).
99. Shaffer, supra note 85, at 476–77.
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[P]articipation in WTO political and judicial processes are
complementary. The shadow of WTO judicial processes shape
bilateral negotiations, just as political processes and contexts
inform judicial decisions. If developing countries can clarify
their public goods priorities and coordinate their strategies, then
they will more effectively advance their interests in bargaining
conducted in WTO law’s shadow, and in WTO legal complaints
heard in the shadow of bargaining. They, in turn, will be better
prepared to exploit the ‘flexibilities’ of the TRIPS Agreement,
tailoring their intellectual property laws accordingly, and will
gain confidence in their ability to ward off US and EC threats
100
against their policy choices.
To level the playing field and enable less developed countries to take
greater advantage of the dispute settlement process, the Advisory
Centre on WTO Law was established to provide legal advice and
support in WTO matters and to train government officials in WTO
101
law. India, for example, has been “a relatively frequent user” of this
102
Unfortunately, the Centre is understaffed and has only a
Centre.
small number of lawyers who have to be prepared to litigate all of the
103
WTO agreements.
Moreover, because the Centre focuses primarily
on WTO dispute settlement, it does not satisfy all of the needs of less
developed countries, which “need to coordinate political and judicial
strategies since intellectual property matters are advanced in a strategic
104
fashion before multiple fora.”
Thus, Professor Shaffer proposed to “pool . . . resources through
national, regional, and international centers specializing in trade-related
105
intellectual property issues.”
As he maintained, “[r]egional centers
could create benchmarks for policy, provide a forum for the sharing of
experiences, and identify best practices. [They] could also better
coordinate training of developing country officials and non106
governmental representatives.”
In addition, the centers would
develop human capital and know-how in WTO law that could be tapped

100. Id.
101. Information about the Advisory Centre on WTO Law is available at
http://www.acwl.ch/.
102. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 87, at 45.
103. See Shaffer, supra note 85, at 478 (“The Advisory Centre has only seven lawyers
who must be prepared to litigate over 19 WTO agreements. It thus lacks specific expertise in
trade-related intellectual property matters.”).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 477.
106. Id. at 478.
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for WTO matters, when needed. They also would enable countries to
take advantage of their collective position as repeat players in WTO
litigation and thus benefit from the greater economies of scale in
deploying legal resources, even though they individually bring only a
very
108
small number of WTO cases vis-à-vis their developed counterparts.
As less developed countries are better able to take advantage of the
WTO dispute settlement process, they will have more faith in the WTO
system, which in turn will create more satisfaction and stability in the
109
international trading system.
D. Add Explicit Access Rights to the TRIPs Agreement
One of the biggest deficiencies of the TRIPs Agreement and the
existing international intellectual property system is the lack of explicit

107. See id. at 474. As Professor Shaffer explained:
Because of developing countries’ less frequent use of the WTO system and
their lack of local legal capital, the alternative for a developing country to train
internal lawyers with WTO expertise is typically worse than hiring expensive US or
European outside legal counsel. Training internal counsel entails a significant longterm allocation of resources, which is not cost-effective if a country is not an active
player in the litigation system. Start-up costs are high and potential economies of
scale low. Moreover, where a developing country’s internal lawyers develop
expertise and exhibit talent, they can be snatched up by private law firms that pay
salaries against which governments in developing countries cannot compete.
Although lawyers regularly leave government in the United States for the
private sector, the fact that they largely remain in Washington and often
subsequently return to government as part of Washington’s ‘revolving door’
bureaucratic culture means that US trade authorities are much more likely to take
advantage of their acquired expertise. . . . The spillover effects for developing
countries, in contrast, are largely negative, since, once a developing country trade
official leaves to work for the private sector in the United States or Europe, that
individual is not available locally within the developing country and almost never
returns to government service.
Id. at 475.
108. See id.
109. As Professor Shaffer explained:
Developing countries’ perceptions of the WTO system also feed back on their
awareness of whether they have legal defenses and claims available. Where
developing countries and their commercial constituents have little faith in the WTO
system, they are less likely to develop mechanisms to detect manipulations and
violations of WTO law that affect their interests. Even when they become aware of
measures against which they could invoke their legal rights, developing countries are
less likely to develop pro-active strategies to defend these rights and interests if they
believe that the system is structured in a way that they cannot do so in a costeffective manner.
Id. at 475.
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rights in obtaining public access to protected materials.
Indeed,
“[p]ublic interest objectives, typically represented by user groups such
as libraries, educational institutions, research institutes, or nongovernmental organizations[,] were noticeably absent during TRIPS
111
negotiations.”
While the lack of explicit rights might be less
problematic in a system where intellectual property rights are the
exception, rather than the rule, such a lack becomes a major problem in
112
today’s system where such rights are more the rule than the exception.
As Rochelle Dreyfuss noted, “[u]ser access did not need specific
delineation when it was the background rule; only the exceptionalism of
intellectual property rights required express definition. But if the new
background is proprietary control, then the exceptionalism of user rights
113
now needs to be embedded into positive law.”
In recent years, commentators have pushed for proposals that call
114
for greater protection of the fair use/fair dealing privilege.
As
Professor Dreyfuss explained:
110. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 28 (arguing for the need to use the next round of
GATT negotiations to add explicit user rights to the TRIPs Agreement); Okediji,
International Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 87, at 87 (arguing the lack of an international fair
use doctrine in existing international copyright law and that “such a doctrine is vital for
effectuating traditional copyright policy in a global market for copyrighted works as well as
for capitalizing on the benefits of protecting intellectual property under the free trade
system”). As Professor Dreyfuss explained:
[It is not surprising that the TRIPs Agreement] does little . . . to explicitly safeguard
the interests of those who seek to use protected works. . . . Because the free traders
who negotiated the GATT worked in an environment in which the core concern,
reducing market barriers, was viewed as producing (at least in the long term)
unmitigated welfare gains, they were not likely to appreciate the social importance,
in TRIPS, of balancing proprietary interests against public access needs. Moreover,
to the extent that the United States was a prime mover in the Uruguay Round, its
intent was to ease U.S. trade deficits by creating broader exclusive markets for
intellectual products, a goal with rather a scant role for user rights. As a result, the
TRIPS Agreement specifies levels of protection that can be exceeded, but not easily
diminished. User interests are largely left to domestic practice through provisions
like the famous (now notorious) “three-part” tests, which permit members to create
limited derogations from protection, but only so long as they do not unreasonably
conflict with normal exploitation of the protected work or unreasonably prejudice
the right holder (taking into account, in the case of patents, the interests of third
parties).
Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 21.
111. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO, supra note 11, at 858.
112. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577, 587 (1999) (discussing “the shifting baseline in the intellectual property field”).
113. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 27.
114. See sources cited supra note 110.
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[E]xperience with the aspirational aspects of other constitutive
agreements suggests that [the approach to stress the aspirational
aspects of the TRIPs Agreement] has its limits. Institutionally,
dispute resolution panels and the Appellate Body are, at best,
courts. They are not well positioned to engage in the kind of
lawmaking that can forge delicate balances among interests and
create equilibria durable over a range of factual circumstances.
Infusing content into precatory statements is, in any event,
difficult, especially when antithetical interests are explicitly
115
codified.
However, such proposals alone would not be enough to satisfy all of
the needs of less developed countries—especially concerning their needs
for education, research, and knowledge dissemination. While less
developed countries need fair use, they are in more desperate need of
116
discounted bulk use, if not free use.
Unless such use is considered
“fair,” the international intellectual property system will need more
reforms than just the introduction of international fair use/fair dealing
principles.
In light of these special needs, Ruth Okediji recently called for the
117
revision of the Appendix to the Berne Convention, which permits
115. Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 23.
116. See Okediji, Fostering Access to Education, supra note 81, at 5 (noting that most
less developed countries need “bulk access to copyrighted works to meet [their] educational
needs”).
117. See id. As Professor Okediji described:
The Appendix requires countries [that] intend to avail themselves of the
Appendix to self-identify by notifying WIPO. Under Article II, a developing
country must wait three years after first publication before it can exercise the
compulsory license for translations. Even then, the compulsory license cannot be
issued if the original right owner has exercised the translation right in the language
at issue. During the three year ban, the only means of bulk access would be
negotiations with the copyright owner. For most scientific works, waiting three
years means that there is a risk of the information becoming less relevant. Another
noteworthy problem with the Appendix is that after a citizen in a developing
country has filed for a license, there is a six-month grace period during which the
copyright owner can exercise the translation right. Only if the owner does not do so
in this period will the compulsory license proceed to issue. Finally, it is important to
note that Article II licenses apply only to teaching, scholarship and research.
Article III licenses are the second major component of the Appendix. An
Article III license can only be obtained to reproduce and publish for use in
connection with systematic instructional activities. These licenses may be issued
after a five-year period from the date of first publication. For scientific works, the
waiting period is three years. For works of fiction, poetry, drama, music and art, the
waiting period is seven years.
There are other features of the Appendix, but a few notable ones include the
fact that the Appendix bans parallel imports and requires compensation on specified
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unauthorized, compensated uses of copyrighted works, but is largely
118
unused by less developed countries. As she noted, “At the very least,
the time barriers and other features that have rendered the Appendix a
failure must be positively addressed. Otherwise, the Appendix simply
119
remains a dull sword for advancing development interests.” She also
called for “more specific adaptation of the Appendix to the digital
120
environment” and the development of “countervailing principles that
121
Deborah
preclude countries from negotiating around access rules.”
Hurley, the former director of the Harvard Information Infrastructure
Project, called for the abolition of copyright ownership in government
122
works, or the so-called crown copyrights.
To her, the removal of
crown copyrights is “[t]he step that would make the biggest sea change
tomorrow in intellectual property protection and access to
123
information.”
Uma Suthersanen articulated the need to forge an

terms.
Id. at 10.
118. See id. at 9 (describing the Berne Appendix as “a dismal failure”). As Professor
Okediji explained,
[t]he complex conditions imposed on countries that may be interested in using the
Appendix, coupled with a lack of understanding of the Appendix, has stymied any
significant examination of the viability of the Appendix to address the chronic
undersupply of educational materials in developing countries. Following the TRIPS
Agreement, developing countries interested in utilizing the Appendix were required
to notify the WTO of their intention. Very few countries filed a declaration to this
effect. It is unclear whether this will have any material effect on the right of
developing countries to use the Appendix notwithstanding this omission.
Id. at 9–10.
119. Id. at 10.
120. Id. at 11.
121. Id. at 12.
122. See DEBORAH HURLEY, POLE STAR: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 36–37 (2003), available at http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/
globalization/wsis/polestar.pdf; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (stipulating that “[c]opyright
protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government”).
As she explained:
There would be two immediate benefits. First, large quantities of information
would become freely available, increasing access to information. Governments, by
and large, produce political, social services, economic, and research information, in
other words, the types of information that people need for carrying out their lives,
helping others, and bettering their own situations. Secondly, governments, by
placing their large thumbs firmly on the side of the scale tipped toward more access
to information, would reframe the debate and send a strong signal to other content
providers.
HURLEY, supra, at 36–37.
123. HURLEY, supra note 122, at 36.
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124

international public interest rule.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and
Jerome Reichman advocated the application of the misuse doctrine and
competition law at the international level to curb the abuse of market
125
power.
In addition, many commentators have articulated the needs for
explicit exemptions, compulsory licensing, and facilitation of cheap
126
parallel imports to advance development goals. Such an arrangement
is not limited only to the education context. Commentators, for
example, have discussed at length the need for such accommodation in
127
the public health arena.
In the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs
Agreement and Public Health, less developed countries have requested
language that protects their needs to have access to affordable drugs in
128
light of the public health crises they experience.
The Declaration
clarified article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement by recognizing in each
WTO Member “the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom
129
to determine the grounds on which such licenses are granted.”
The
Declaration also stated explicitly that “[e]ach Member has the right to

124. See Uma Suthersanen, The Future of Copyright Reform in Developing Countries:
Teleological Interpretation, Localized Globalism and the “Public Interest” Rule 24 (Int’l Ctr.
for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Oct. 24–28, 2005), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/
bellagio/Bellagio2005/Suthersanen_final.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
125. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture:
International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private Business: A “Trade Law
Approach” for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
545, 563 (1996) (“Not only developing countries with underdeveloped national competition
and intellectual property rights laws, but also developed countries will need more systematic
rules on the protection of competition among trade-related intellectual property rights and on
the prevention of their anticompetitive abuse.”); Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair
Followers, supra note 65, at 52–58 (proposing to use “competition law to curb the abuse of
market power” as a pro-competitive strategy for implementing the TRIPs Agreement in less
developed countries).
126. See, e.g., Okediji, Fostering Access to Education, supra note 81, at 11–12.
127. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing
Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2001); Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS and Access to
Drugs: Toward a Solution for Developing Countries Without Manufacturing Capacity?, 17
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 389 (2003); Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS
Agreement, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307 (2004); Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and
Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS
Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777 (2004); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals,
Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2002); Ellen ‘t Hoen,
TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle
to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27 (2002).
128. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
129. Id. ¶ 5(b).
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determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises,
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances
130
of extreme urgency.”
In addition, the Declaration “recognize[d] that WTO Members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing
131
under the TRIPS Agreement.”
To implement the Declaration, the
Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health “create[d] a
means for the grant of licenses from any third country to developing
countries that lack the capacity and know-how to produce high-quality
pharmaceuticals, as they lack the market size to justify the
132
investment.”
In the recent WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong
Kong, this decision was made permanent when the WTO member states
133
agreed to amend the TRIPs Agreement.
E. Explore the Use of Alternative International Regimes
Commentators have recently discussed the regime- or forum-shifting
phenomenon, in which countries move their treaty negotiations from
134
one international forum to another in an effort to maximize payoffs.
Although developed countries have more political leverage and are
135
more likely to engage in a regime shift, less developed countries have

130. Id. ¶ 5(c).
131. Id. ¶ 6.
132. Shaffer, supra note 85, at 481; see also General Council, Implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540
(Sept. 2, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004). This decision will not terminate until “the date on which
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for that
Member.” Id. ¶ 11.
133. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement And Public
Health: Proposal for a Decision on an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6,
2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/trips_decision_e.doc.
134. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 564–71 (2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1
(2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting]; Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?, supra note 52;
Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 408–16.
135. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 134, at 565 (maintaining that “[f]orumshifting is a strategy that only the powerful and well-resourced can use”). A good example of

YU - FORMATTED

3/3/2006 12:30:56 PM

402 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:2

increasingly used regime shifting to enhance their negotiating positions
and to demand what they otherwise would not be able to get in a forum,
especially one in which their interests are ignored or marginalized.
Although less developed countries still have little ability to increase
bargaining power by shifting regimes, they have successfully used
regime shifting to develop the political groundwork needed for stronger
136
counterbalancing language in international treaties.
The Doha
Declaration is a good example. Had it not been for increasing action by
less developed countries in these other regimes, these countries might
not have been successful in pushing for favorable language in the
137
Declaration. Moreover, the international intellectual property regime,
138
to some extent, is handicapped by its lack of maximum standards. By
exploring language used in other regimes, such as the biodiversity
regime or the human rights regime, less developed countries, therefore,
might be able to develop counterregime norms that set up maximum
139
standards of intellectual property protection.
regime shifts initiated by developed countries is the shift from WIPO to GATT/WTO in the
1980s to negotiate heightened standards of intellectual property protection.
136. See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 134, at 59 (noting that regime shifting
“function[s] as an intermediate strategy that allows developing countries to generate the
political groundwork necessary for new rounds of intellectual property lawmaking in the
WTO and WIPO”).
137. By laying down the principles, this language could be very important. As
Professors John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos explained:
The globalization of regulation is played out as a contest of principles. Agreements
would rarely be made if they started as enforceable bodies of rules. Any precision
in the rules would immediately create a veto coalition disadvantaged by that way of
framing the rules. The uncertainty implicit in principles concerning a problem (that
everyone agrees is a problem) allows everyone to sign on. All hope the regime will
not become more specific over time in a way that will hurt their future interests. But
since they may not be sure of what those future interests will be (e.g. whether they
will more frequently end up as complainants or defendants under the rules), they
sign. Indeed, a virtue of a thicker veil of uncertainty is that it “increases incentives
to formulate provisions that are fair or equitable.” Sometimes this causes parties to
intentionally thicken the veil of uncertainty initially (e.g. by lengthening the time or
the range of issues to which a regime will apply) to ensure that all parties can lock in
to mutually acceptable and just foundational principles for a new regime.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 134, at 619 (citations omitted).
138. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 28, at 27 (noting that “the WTO system must begin
to recognize substantive maxima on the scope of available protection”); Laurence R. Helfer,
Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 47, 58 (2003) (noting the need to articulate “maximum standards” of intellectual
property protection because “[t]reaties from Berne to Paris to TRIPS are all concerned with
articulating ‘minimum standards’”); Okediji, International Fair Use Doctrine, supra note 87, at
168 (proposing to develop an international fair use doctrine as a “ceiling”).
139. Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 134, at 14 (discussing how regime shifting
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F. Facilitate Coalition Building
The strategy behind the recent proliferation of free trade
agreements and bilateral and plurilateral negotiations is divide-andconquer. Since the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in
Cancún, the United States has initiated a divide-and-conquer, or
140
“coalition busting,” policy that seeks to reward those willing to work
with the country while undermining the efforts by Brazil, India, and
other members of the Group of 21 to establish a united negotiating front
for less developed countries. As United States Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick wrote in the Financial Times shortly after the
conference, the United States will separate the can-do countries from
the won’t-do and “will move towards free trade with [only] can-do
141
countries.”
This strategy was not new. Indeed, it has been used by the United
States to increase its leverage vis-à-vis less developed countries during
the TRIPs negotiations. In the 1980s, the United States successfully
used section 301 sanctions to isolate such opposition countries as
142
Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand.
As Jayashree Watal noted in the case of South Korea, which was
threatened with sanctions for inadequate protection for computer
programs, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals and in the copyright, patent,
trademark areas:
[A]n important subsidiary objective . . . was to separate Korea
from joining developing country opposition to the GATT
initiative on IPRs. Korea was a soft target not only because of its
dependence on exports and more particularly on the US, but
because it had already reached a certain level of development
and could make the transition to strengthened IPR protection
143
more easily.
To counterbalance this divide-and-conquer strategy, less developed
countries need to initiate a combine-and-conquer strategy—or, simply

provides an opportunity to generate “counterregime norms”).
140. ASIA-PACIFIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT INITIATIVE, UNDP REGIONAL
CENTER IN COLOMBO, THE GREAT MAZE—REGIONAL AND BILATERAL FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS IN ASIA: TRENDS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 50 (2005), available at http://www.undprcc.lk/web_trade/publications/Policy
%20Paper%20Book%203.pdf.
141. Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won’t-Do Countries, FIN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
142. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 413.
143. WATAL, supra note 3, at 18 (footnote omitted).
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put, to build more coalitions. A case in point is what the Group of 21
did in the Cancún Ministerial: They successfully prevented the WTO
member states from reaching agreement on such issues as investment,
144
competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.
Notwithstanding the success of this coalition, less developed countries
need to remain vigilant, because such success might be short-lived due
to the widely divergent interests among the group members. As
Sungjoon Cho explained:
One could not confidently predict that [the collective stance
taken by the Group of 21] will remain as solid in the future as it
was in Cancún. Interests of G-21 members are not homogenous.
For instance, while India still wants to protect domestic
agricultural industries, Brazil, a member of the Cairns Group
consisting of agricultural product exporters, wants to further
liberalize trade in this area. Moreover, we witnessed other
groups of developing countries, such as the G-33, which
advocated the inclusion of strategic products and a special
safeguard mechanism in the agriculture negotiation; the coalition
of the African Union, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific
countries, and the LDCs (AU/ACP/LDCs) which collectively
want the preservation of current preferential treatment in
145
addition to G-33 demands.
Moreover, less developed countries have had limited success in using
coalition building to increase their bargaining leverage, partly due to the
fact that they are “highly dependent on the developed countries as the
source of capital, whether it is provided through the IMF or World
146
Bank, or through investment bankers and securities exchanges.”
As
Frederick Abbott observed:
Over the past 50 years, there have been a number of efforts to
achieve solidarity or common positions among developing
countries in international forums. At the broad multilateral level
there was (and are) the Group of 77, and the movement for a
New International Economic Order. At the regional level, the
Andean Pact in the early 1970s developed a rather sophisticated
common plan to address technology and IP issues (ie Decisions
84 and 85). Yet these efforts were largely unsuccessful in shifting

144. See sources cited supra note 5.
145. Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 236
(2004) (footnotes omitted).
146. Frederick Abbott, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in
TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 41, at 36, 43.
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the balance of negotiating leverage away from developed
countries. In fact, developing country common efforts to reform
the Paris Convention in the late 1970s and early 1980s are
routinely cited as the triggering event for movement of
147
intellectual property negotiations to the GATT.
This combine-and-conquer strategy is also useful in the WTO
dispute settlement context. Based on the United States’ past refusal to
implement successful GATT findings against the United States by
smaller countries, commentators have rightly questioned whether less
developed countries will “have the diplomatic or economic muscle to
148
ensure that the decision is implemented” even if they win their case.
Indeed, as William Davey has suggested, there is a good chance that
“even massive retaliation by a small country would be unnoticed by a
149
larger one.” Thus, it is important to combine the efforts of various less
developed countries to maximize the impact on a violating developed
150
country.
In addition to building coalitions among themselves, less developed
countries “need to work consistently with U.S. and European political
151
allies to alter the U.S. and European domestic political contexts.” As
Gregory Shaffer noted in the public health context:
If developing countries cannot neutralize the clout of large
pharmaceutical firms in the formation of US and European
positions, then developing countries will face the full brunt of US
and European coercion in the negotiation and enforcement of
pharmaceutical patent rights. In a world of asymmetric power,
developing countries enhance the prospects of their success if
other US and European constituencies offset the pharmaceutical
industry’s pressure on US and European trade authorities to
152
aggressively advance industry interests.
In her book, Susan Sell recounted how twelve corporate executives
have successfully pushed for the introduction of the TRIPs Agreement
despite limited intellectual property expertise at the national and
153
international policymaking levels. As she boldly declared, “[i]n effect,
147. Id. at 42.
148. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51, 90
(1987).
149. Id. at 102.
150. Cf. id. (offering a different proposal “to allow smaller nations ‘excess’
retaliation”).
151. Shaffer, supra note 85, at 479.
152. Id. at 479–80.
153. As Professor Sell explained:
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twelve corporations made public law for the world.”
While some
might query whether Professor Sell exaggerated the role of
multinational corporations in the TRIPs negotiations, one could not
ignore her important message that the domestic political contexts could
play an important role in influencing international developments.
Indeed, as Helen Milner pointed out, international cooperation, to some
155
extent, is the continuation of domestic politics by other means. “The
structure of domestic preferences,” she maintains, “holds a key to
156
understanding international cooperation.”
G. Explore the Tension Between the European Communities and the
United States
Less developed countries need to explore the tension between the
European Communities and the United States. Although the United
States and Members of the European Communities are all developed
countries, they do not have a convergent position on intellectual
property protection. In the copyright context, for example, they harbor
wide disagreement concerning “the protection of moral rights, fair use,
the first sale doctrine, the work-made-for-hire arrangement, and
157
protection against private copying in the digital environment.” There
is also a wide disagreement in such issues as the protection of
158
geographical indications. Indeed, the European Communities’ initial
ambivalent position toward the creation of the TRIPs Agreement might
not have changed had the United States refused to include geographical

Not all ideas are equally privileged in political life; therefore how one defines
“interests” is central to understanding which sets of ideas affect policy.
Furthermore, it is important to identify who is defining them. By promoting their
particular vision as a solution to pressing US trade problems, the IP activists
captured the imagination of policymakers and persuaded them to adopt their private
interests as US national interests. Additionally, their initiative in producing
concrete negotiating proposals significantly strengthened their hand.
SELL, supra note 11, at 8.
154. Id. at 96.
155. See HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION:
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 246–47 (1997).
156. Id. at 33; see also id. at 239 (suggesting that the legislature is more likely to adopt a
proposal that it does not fully understand when it can depend on one or more informed
domestic groups to signal it about the proposal).
157. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra note 13, at 625–26 (citations
omitted).
158. For a discussion of the protection of geographical indications, see generally Paul J.
Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635 (1996).
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159

indications in the proposed GATT.
Thus, it is very important to develop a list of differences between the
European Communities and the United States. It is also important to
develop a list of exceptions commonly found in intellectual property
laws in the United States and Members of the European Communities.
Both lists will be helpful in preparing policymakers to understand the
divergent positions taken by the European Communities and the United
States and will enable them to have more desirable negotiation
outcomes. An understanding of the tension between the European
Communities and the United States will also prevent them from
160
committing to conflicting obligations under the free trade agreements.
It is bad enough to be forced to sign a bilateral agreement that does not
meet local conditions. It is even worse to be put in a position in which
they have to juggle two conflicting agreements that do not meet local
conditions and that they cannot honor.
Sadly, negotiators from the European Communities and the United
States are likely to be more concerned about the intellectual property
standards they demand than those they dislike. For example, the
United States is likely to be more concerned about the lack of
protection against circumvention of copy-protection technologies than
the fact that the target country offers strong protection to geographical
indications. Likewise, the European Communities will be more
concerned about the target country’s refusal to offer strong moral rights
protection than its adoption of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
161
Resolution Policy or the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
162
of the United States.
If less developed countries do not understand the tension between
the European Communities and the United States, they ultimately
might adopt the stronger protection of both trading blocs. In other
words, their protection might be stronger than what is offered in the
developed world. Indeed, commentators have noted that the recent

159. See WATAL, supra note 3, at 23 (noting that the European Communities began to
root for a GATT treaty “perhaps after a decision among developed countries to include the
subject of geographical indications”).
160. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 20, at 398–99.
161. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Aug. 26, 1999), available at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm. The UDRP sets forth the terms and conditions
related to a dispute between the registrant and a third party over the registration and use of a
domain name.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
provides civil remedies to victims of cybersquatting.
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protection required by the free trade agreements signed by the United
States is sometimes higher than what is offered in the United States. As
Carlos Correa has noted, “[b]y creating through bilateral negotiations
standards of protection higher than those applied domestically, the
powerful U.S. [industries] may be able to force an amendment of U.S.
domestic law in ways simpler and less costly that [sic] through lobbying
163
in Congress.”
H. Assess the Compatibility Between the Free Trade Agreements and the
Multilateral Trading System
In recent years, the United States has signed free trade agreements
with a number of less developed countries, including Chile, Singapore,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
164
Honduras, Nicaragua, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Peru, and Oman.
Although these agreements include primarily “TRIPs-plus” provisions,
it remains unclear whether the agreements will be fully compatible with
the multilateral trading system.
Consider, for example, the mandatory dispute settlement process,
which is one of the crowning achievements of the Uruguay Round. As
the bargain and self-interest narratives have shown, many countries
signed on to the TRIPs Agreement because they wanted to be protected
from the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and other
developed countries.
This major bargain, however, has been
significantly undercut by the choice-of-forum provisions of the recent
bilateral and regional free trade agreements, which allow treaty parties
to file a complaint in a forum other than the WTO Dispute Settlement
165
Body.
To be certain, the United States will still have to defend a WTO
complaint using the mandatory dispute settlement process, unless it can
persuade, or compel, other member states to file the complaint in the
alternative forum. Nevertheless, when the United States serves as the
complainant, it will have a choice of forums, and may be able to use the
163. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, supra note 52, at 93.
164. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States and Oman Sign Free
Trade Agreement (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/
Press_Releases/2006/January/asset_upload_file25_8774.pdf.
165. For a discussion of the choice-of-forum provisions in the bilateral and regional
free trade agreements initiated by the United States, see generally Peter Drahos, The
Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/
DisputeResolution/TheBilateralWebOfTradeDisputeSettlementPeterDrahos.doc (last visited
Jan. 24, 2006).
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alternative forum in the shadow of the WTO dispute settlement process.
Even more problematic for less developed countries, the bilateral forum
may not offer similar pro-development safeguards that have been
recognized by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. There is also a
strong likelihood that the treaty provisions will be interpreted based on
the U.S. legal tradition, even if such a tradition may not sit well with the
less developed country party.
Moreover, due to the bilateral nature of the alternative dispute
settlement process, the outcome of the process will be limited to the
parties involved. Such a process, therefore, may threaten to undermine
the international trading system. As Professor Drahos observed:
[T]hese choice-of-forum provisions to be found in US bilaterals
do not sit very comfortably with the goal of strengthening the
multilateral trading system. WTO members are meant to have
recourse to the DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding] when
they decide to pursue a remedy for a breach of a WTO
agreement. . . . There are good reasons in principle to encourage
parties to use the DSU. When parties resolve a trade dispute
that requires a determination of obligation in one or more of the
covered agreements of the WTO they deliver a public good for
other members, assuming that the dispute results in a greater
certainty of the interpretation of the rules. Where an infringing
state brings a measure into conformity with an obligation it has
under a covered agreement it will be of benefit to all other
members by virtue of the MFN principle. In short, the third
party benefits of two states obtaining a ruling to a dispute under
a multilateralized dispute resolution mechanism may be
considerable. The same cannot be said of bilateral dispute
resolution proceedings.
By their nature they prop up
preferential trading arrangements that operate outside of scope
166
of the MFN principle.
Thus, it is important for less developed countries to assess the
compatibility between the free trade agreements they have signed and
the multilateral trading system. It is also essential to evaluate whether
the agreements will have any adverse impact on the bargains the
countries have struck during the TRIPs negotiations. While the free
trade agreements may not be in violation of the TRIPs Agreement,
those agreements could, in effect, cut back the gains obtained by less
developed countries during the negotiation process.

166. Id. at 12–13.
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CONCLUSION
The TRIPs Agreement had very complex origins. To account for
these origins, commentators have advanced four dominant, and
sometimes competing, narratives.
Unfortunately, none of these
narratives fully explains the development of the Agreement. Rather,
each provides valuable insight into understanding the context in which
the Agreement was created. While it is important to understand how
the TRIPs Agreement came into existence, it is more important to
understand why it came about and what countries need to do to
preserve the goals and intentions behind the TRIPs negotiations.
Although there has been much discussion about the “one-way ratchet”
of intellectual property protection recently pushed by developed
countries, the battle to protect less developed countries against this
enhanced protection has not been lost. Whether less developed
countries will be able to have an intellectual property system that meets
local needs will depend on whether they can take advantage of the
TRIPs Agreement and reform the international intellectual property
system.

